CHAPTER 3 第3章
Commencement of laytime 装卸时间的起算
THE INDIAN CASES 涉及印度的相关案例
3.215 The reports contain a number of cases arising out of particular requirements imposed by Indian Customs law in relation to commencement of laytime. The case of The Atlantic Sunbeam has already been considered. That case related to a requirement for ships to obtain a document called a ‘‘jetty challan’’ before proceeding up the River Hooghly to Calcutta and, although this is issued by the port commissioners, there is a Customs input.
3.215案例报告中包括许多来自于印度海关法对涉及装卸时间起算的特殊要求方面的案件。The Atlantic Sunbeam案已是提到过。该案的特殊要求是：在驶往Hooghly/胡格利河上游的加尔各答港前必须获得称谓“jetty challan”的许可证，尽管该文件是由118黑白图库当局签发的，它亦是海关法的一项规定。
3.216 At Indian ports there are a number of stages to be followed in order to gain Customs clearance. The usual practice is for the owners or their agents to lodge with the Customs a ‘‘prior entry’’ document or documents before the ship’s arrival. This consists principally of the ship’s manifest and once ﬁled enables the receivers to process the documents required for receiving and clearing the goods. On arrival at an inner anchorage, if the vessel is to discharge at an anchorage, or at a berth, if the vessel is to discharge alongside, then the ﬁnal Customs procedures are followed. This involves the representation of the manifest, together with such documents as the ship’s register, port clearance from the last port of call, list of vessel’s stores and list of crew’s private property. Upon receipt of these, which may be tendered at any time, ‘‘inward entry’’ will be granted, usually on the following business day. ‘‘Inward entry’’ is sometimes referred to in the cases as ‘‘ﬁnal entry’’ and, inter alia, grants to the vessel permission from the Customs to break bulk.
3.217 In a London Arbitration referred to in Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter No 90, in The Apollon, and in The Delian Leto, each of the laytime clauses contained a requirement as a condition precedent that the vessel concerned should have been entered at the Custom House before laytime could commence. In each of these cases, one of the issues raised was whether it was necessary for the full Customs procedure to be followed or whether it would sufﬁce for the ﬁrst or ‘‘prior to entry’’ stage to have been completed. In each case the decision was that the initial stage would sufﬁce. In The Apollon, Bingham J said:
Although the language of the charterparty did not expressly refer to entry under the ‘‘prior to entry’’ rules, it was in my judgment both the correct and commercial construction of this contract that the vessel was indeed entered at the time when entry was necessary and required in order to permit discharge.
3.217在1983年第90期《劳氏海商法资讯》一个伦敦仲裁中提及到有两个案例，The Apollon案和The Delian Leto案。它们的装卸时间条款中都有一个前提条件，即要求船舶必须在报关后，才能起算装卸时间。两案例中都有这样一个的争议：是否必须要办完所有海关手续？或者已经完成‘预申报’阶段是否就已足够？两个案例都判决办完初始阶段申报就已足够了。在The Apollon案中，Bingham法官说：
3.218 However, in The Albion and The Nestor, Webster J and Leggatt J were each persuaded that entry at the Customs House meant ﬁnal rather than prior entry. It seems that each of the judges accepted a ﬁnding by the respective arbitrators that discharge of cargo prior to ﬁnal entry was illegal under sections 30, 31 of the Indian Customs Act 1962. The practical effect of these decisions in most cases is to turn such charters into berth charters, putting the risk of delay due to congestion on to owners.
3.218然而，在The Albion案和The Nestor案，Webster法官和Leggatt法官均被说服相信：报关意味着最终登记而不是预先申报。似乎每一个法官都接受了各自仲裁员的认定，依据1962年印度海关法的第30-31节的规定，在最终登记之前卸货属于非法行为。在许多案例中这些判决的实际后果就是将这种租船合同变成了泊位租船合同，并将由于118黑白图库拥挤造成的延迟的风险转移到船东身上了。
3.219 Interestingly enough, the Indian High Court in Bombay decided in a case called The Jag Leela that prior, rather than ﬁnal, entry should be the criterion. The court therefore declined to follow what at that time were the most recent English High Court cases and pointed out that the words ‘‘entered at the Customs House’’ did not appear in the Indian Act. The words ‘‘entry inwards’’ in section 31 of the Act was nothing to do with the relations between the parties as governed by the charter. The ship’s agents had to take the steps leading to prior entry, but thereafter the rest of the procedure was for the proper ofﬁcer of the Customs and was nothing to do with the obligations of the parties under the charter.
3.219非常有趣的是，在孟买的印度高等法院审判的The Jag Leela案中，判定是应是预先申报，而不是最终登记作为报关的标准。法院因此也拒绝跟从当时英国高等法院的最新案例，并指出在印度法规中并未出现‘向海关部门申报’这样的词句。在法案第31节中‘进港登记’词语与租船合同的当事方并无任何关系。船舶代理仅负责预先申报登记，但此后剩下的程序就是由适合的海关官员负责办理了，与租船合同中当事人的义务并没有关系。
3.220 In The Antclizo (No 2), Hirst J considered all four previous English cases at length and concluded that he should not follow the decisions in The Albion and The Nestor and that completion of prior entry satisﬁed requirements in the charter with which he was concerned as to Customs clearance, which required the vessel to have been entered at the Custom House and in free pratique. That decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal and therefore as both Indian and English law now stand, completion of prior entry will sufﬁce. It should be noted, however, that this latest English decision did not decide that prior entry was a mere formality or did not form a condition precedent to tendering notice of readiness. In this respect it should be contrasted with the Voylayrules 1993 deﬁnition of entry at the Custom House which reads as follows:
‘‘VESSEL BEING IN FREE PRATIQUE’’ and/or ‘‘HAVING BEEN ENTERED AT THE CUSTOM HOUSE’’
shall mean that the completion of these formalities shall not be a condition precedent to tendering notice of readiness, but any time lost by reason of delay in the vessel’s completion of either of these formalities shall not count as laytime or time on demurrage.
3.220在审理The Antdizo(No 2)案时，Hirst法官详细地研究了所有的4个早期的英国案例后得出结论是他不应当跟从The Albion和The Nestor两案的判决。所以，他认为，完成了预申报就符合租船合同的要求规定，这里他指的是船舶向海关部门申报和通过检疫等结关手续。这一判决得到了上诉法院的支持，因此，目前的印度法和英国法都认为，完成了预申报就足够了。然而，值得一提的是，最新的英国判例并没有明确预申报仅仅是一种例行手续，也没有明确它不是递交准备就绪通知书的先决条件。在这方面，就应该对照《1993年航次租船合同装卸时间解释规则》中对报关的定义了，如下即：
3.221 This deﬁnition will therefore apply only if the rules are speciﬁcally incorporated into the charter.