CHAPTER 3 第3章
Commencement of laytime 装卸时间的起算
3.389 A more recent consideration is Carga del Sur Compania Naviera SA v. Ross T Smyth & Co Ltd (The Seafort), a decision of McNair J. Here the Seafort was chartered for the carriage of grain from Vancouver to London and Hull under a Baltimore berth grain charter. Under clause 9, ‘‘Time at second port to count from arrival of vessel at second port, whether in berth or not’’, Hull was the second port and it was usual for vessels of the Seafort’s size to wait for a berth to become available at Spurn Head Anchorage, some 22 miles from the port. The anchorage was outside the legal, administrative and ﬁscal limits of Hull. Rejecting the owners’ claim that time started to run at Spurn Head, McNair J said:
By using the words ‘‘arrival... at second port’’ in this charterparty the parties must, I think, be presumed to have intended that the normal conditions which determine whether a ship has ‘‘arrived’’ at or in a port should apply.
In my judgment, the true effect of the last sentence of clause 9 is to provide that time which has started to run at the ﬁrst discharge port shall start to run again after the passage between the ﬁrst and second discharging ports has been completed by arrival at the second discharging port...
3.389一个比较近的审议是Carga del Sur Compania Naviera SA v. Ross T Smyth & Co Ltd (The Seafort)案，由McNair法官审判的。该案中，Seafort轮以波罗的海泊位谷物租船合同由温哥华往伦敦和赫尔港运输谷物。根据合同第9条款的规定，‘不论靠泊与否，在第二港的装卸时间从抵达时起算。’赫尔港即为第二港，通常，像Seafort轮这种大小的船舶都要在距该港22海里远的Spurn Head锚地等泊，该锚地在赫尔港的法定、行政和财政管辖范围之外。McNair法官驳回了船东主张从抵达Spurn Head就开始计算装卸时间的要求，说：
3.390 The meaning of the phrase was also considered by the Court of Appeal in The Johanna Oldendorff on that case’s way to the House of Lords.
3.390有关这一短语的含义在上诉法院，以及后来的上议院审理的The Johanna Oldendorff案件中也做了解释。
3.391 Having reviewed the authorities, Roskill LJ concluded:
. . . upon the true construction of this phrase its application is, and the phrase has for 50 years always been regarded as, limited to a case where the ship is already an arrived ship and that its use does not dispense with the necessity for the ship being an arrived ship before Notice of Readiness can be given and time start to count. Only when the ship has arrived does the clause operate to make laytime commence even though the vessel is not in berth.
He also pointed out that in that case the same result would have followed even though the phrase had not been used, since it was a port charter.